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OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff John Barna filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 alleging that the Panther Valley School Board (“School 
Board” or “Board”) and several of its officials violated his First 
Amendment rights by categorically banning him from 
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attending Board meetings after he was threatening and 
disruptive on several occasions.  The Board and the individual 
officials moved for summary judgment.  The District Court 
granted the motion, holding that although the Board’s ban 
violated Barna’s constitutional rights, qualified immunity 
shielded both the Board and the officials from liability for 
damages.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.   
 
I. 
 
 The relevant facts are not in dispute.  Barna attended a 
School Board meeting on April 8, 2010, at which he expressed 
concern about a particular school district contract.  Barna 
mentioned that he and his friends were confused by the 
contract, which they perceived as a waste of public resources.  
School Board President Jeffrey Markovich responded by 
suggesting that Barna bring his friends to the next meeting.  
Barna replied:  “You wouldn’t like that.  Some of my friends 
have guns.”  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 129.  Barna asserted at 
his deposition that this remark was a joke.  J.A. 129.   
 
 The Board held another meeting on April 22, 2010.  
Before the meeting began, Markovich told Barna:  “Since you 
say that you have friends with guns, I’m going to have to ask 
you to leave.”  J.A. 130.  Markovich reiterated a similar 
message once the meeting began.  While exiting the meeting, 
Barna stated:  “Don’t laugh.  I may have to come after all of 
yous.”  J.A. 130.  Some meeting attendees construed the 
remark as a threat.   
 
 Barna alleges that after leaving the meeting room, 
David Hiles, a Board member standing in the hallway, made 
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threatening gestures toward him.  A security guard restrained 
Barna as he attempted to follow Hiles.  Barna then returned to 
the Board room and stated that Hiles “just threatened [his] 
life.”  J.A. 131. 
 
 On April 27, 2010, Rosemary Porembo, the school 
district superintendent, informed Barna by letter that he could 
attend Board meetings but would be banned from future 
attendance if he engaged in any threatening or disorderly 
conduct.  Barna subsequently attended several Board meetings 
without incident.   
 
 Barna attended another Board meeting on October 12, 
2011.  Barna raised his voice and became confrontational after 
being denied the opportunity to ask questions.  Markovich 
stood up at some point, which Barna apparently interpreted as 
an invitation to fight.  Barna stated:  “Do you want to fight?  
Let’s go.”  J.A. 133.  Barna admitted that during the meeting 
he “blew [his] top” and was “just mad.”  J.A. 133. 
 
 The Board convened again the next day, at which point 
Barna apologized for his conduct to some, but not all, of the 
Board members.  During a brief recess at the meeting, Barna 
uttered “[s]on of a bitch” within earshot of meeting attendees, 
including some children.  J.A. 135. 
 
 On October 18, 2011, the Board solicitor, Robert 
Yurchak, sent Barna a letter barring him from attending all 
Board meetings or school extracurricular activities because his 
conduct had become “intolerable, threatening and obnoxious” 
and because he was “interfering with the function of the School 
Board.”  J.A. 292.  Barna was also banned from “be[ing] 
physically present” on the Panther Valley campus.  J.A. 292.  
5 
 
Barna was, however, permitted to submit “reasonable and 
responsible” written questions to the Board, which would be 
answered in a timely manner.  J.A. 292.  A Board member 
testified that he did not believe that there was any other way of 
“correct[ing] the problems that the Board had with Mr. Barna.”  
J.A. 249. 
 
 Barna did not write to the Board with any questions or 
comments after receiving the letter, although he did request 
and obtain audiotapes of Board meetings.  J.A. 136.  When 
asked why he had made no additional requests, Barna testified 
that he “gave up” because he was no longer permitted to attend 
Board meetings.  J.A. 136.  
 
 Barna filed this suit on April 5, 2012, and filed an 
amended complaint the following day, naming as defendants 
the School Board and individual Board officials Anthony 
Demarco, David Hiles, William Hunsicker, Jeffrey Markovich, 
Koreen Nalesnik, Anthony Pondish, and Donna Trimmel.  
Barna alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free 
speech (Count 1) and violations of his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to be free from unconstitutional prior 
restraint (Count 2).  
 
The Board and the officials moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, and the officials moved for dismissal based on 
qualified immunity.  The District Court denied these motions 
on October 15, 2013.  The Board and the individual officials 
later moved for summary judgment.  The District Court 
referred the matter to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  Barna 
timely objected.  The District Court ordered supplemental 
briefing and oral argument.  During oral argument on April 10, 
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2015, the parties agreed that there were no disputes of material 
fact.  J.A. 9 n.1.  Barna moved for summary judgment on April 
28, 2015.  On November 6, 2015, the District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of both the Panther Valley School 
Board and the individual School Board officials. 
 
 Barna filed this timely appeal.  
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District Court’s 
grant or denial of summary judgment is plenary, and we apply 
the same standard that the District Court applies.  Kelly v. 
Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).  It is 
appropriate to grant summary judgment when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 
III. 
 
 The District Court determined that the Board’s 
categorical ban on Barna’s attendance at meetings violated 
Barna’s First Amendment rights.  It nonetheless concluded that 
all of the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity 
because the right to participate in School Board meetings 
despite engaging in a pattern of threatening and disruptive 
behavior was not “clearly established.”  Barna does not take 
issue with the District Court’s finding that the ban was 
unconstitutional, and we will not address that determination 
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here.1  Barna instead argues that the District Court erred in 
granting qualified immunity to all of the defendants.  We 
examine the District Court’s conclusion first with respect to the 
individual Board members and then with respect to the Panther 
Valley School Board, a municipal entity.  
 
A. 
 
A plaintiff seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must 
demonstrate “that the defendants, acting under color of law, 
violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights, 
and thereby caused the complained of injury.”  Elmore v. 
Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2005).  Section 1983 is not 
a source of substantive rights but rather “a mechanism to 
vindicate rights afforded by the Constitution or a federal 
statute.”  Black v. Montgomery Cty., 835 F.3d 358, 364 (3d 
Cir.), as amended (Sept. 16, 2016), cert. denied sub nom. 
Pomponio v. Black, 137 S. Ct. 2093 (2017).  A defendant sued 
under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity “unless it is 
shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional 
                                              
1 The School Board and the individual officials, by contrast, 
dispute that the ban was unconstitutional.  The parties have 
discussed at length in their briefing whether a cross-appeal on 
this issue was necessary or even permissible in this case.  We 
need not reach this question, however, because we have “sound 
discretion” to decide the immunity question first, thus avoiding 
the constitutional question of whether a right exists.  See 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (permitting 
courts to determine which of the two prongs of the qualified 
immunity analysis should be addressed first); see also Camreta 
v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011). 
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right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 
conduct.”  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) 
(citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).  A right 
is “clearly established” for these purposes when its “contours . 
. . [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”  Wilson 
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) (citing Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (observing that courts should ask 
“whether the state of the law [at the relevant time] . . . gave 
respondents fair warning that their alleged [conduct] . . . was 
unconstitutional”).  It is not enough that the right is defined at 
a high level of generality; rather, “[t]he dispositive question is 
‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 
established.’”  Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) 
(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).  
 
In conducting the inquiry into whether a right is clearly 
established, we look first for “applicable Supreme Court 
precedent.”  Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir.), as amended (Mar. 
21, 2016).  If none exists, we consider whether there is a case 
of controlling authority in our jurisdiction or a “‘robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ in the Courts of 
Appeals [that] could clearly establish a right for purposes of 
qualified immunity.”  See id. (quoting Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. 
Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam)).  The authority need not 
be “directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed 
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”  al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.  
Barna cites to no case of controlling authority from the 
Supreme Court or our Court supporting his position, and we 
have found none.  To the contrary, we have twice upheld the 
9 
 
temporary removal of a disruptive participant from a limited 
public forum like a school board meeting.2  For instance, in 
Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2011), we held that the 
temporary ejection of a disruptive participant from a municipal 
meeting did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  Id. 
at 213.  Similarly, in Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 
274 (3d Cir. 2004), we upheld the constitutionality of removing 
a speaker from a township meeting to prevent “badgering, 
constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum.”  
Id. at 281.3  Neither case, however, squarely addresses the 
                                              
2 First Amendment doctrine recognizes three types of fora:  the 
traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the 
nonpublic forum.  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).  We regard a limited public forum 
as “a subcategory of the designated public forum.”  Donovan 
ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 
225 (3d Cir. 2003).  The parties do not dispute that a school 
board meeting is a limited public forum.  Barna Br. 23; Board 
Br. 23. 
 
3 Our decisions in Galena and Eichenlaub are also in accord 
with our caselaw holding that there is no categorical right of 
access to school property.  See Student Coal. for Peace v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 776 F.2d 431, 437 
(3d Cir. 1985) (“The courts have never ‘suggested that 
students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional 
right to use all parts of a school building or its immediate 
environs for his unlimited expressive purpose.’” (quoting 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1972))).  
The absence of a clearly established right to access school 
property further undermines Barna’s argument to the extent he 
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constitutionality of a categorical ban proscribing all future 
expression in a limited public forum.   
 
 Notwithstanding the absence of precedential authority, 
Barna urges us to recognize that the right to participate in 
school board meetings despite engaging in a pattern of 
threatening and disruptive behavior was clearly established 
based on a handful of district court decisions, only some of 
which predate the defendants’ institution of the ban.  See 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) (observing 
that decisions “that postdate the conduct in question . . . are of 
no use in the clearly established inquiry” (citations omitted)).  
The only appellate-level case on which Barna relies is 
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2004), as amended 
on reh’g (Jan. 18, 2005).  
 
In Huminski, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit considered the constitutionality of several trespass 
notices that categorically excluded a protestor from a 
courthouse and its parking lot.  The Huminski court held that 
because the trespass notices “in effect prohibit indefinitely any 
and all expressive activity in which [the plaintiff] might want 
to engage,” they were “pervasive enough to be viewed as 
creating a ‘First-Amendment-Free Zone.’”  Id. at 92.  The court 
thus held that the trespass notices unreasonably restricted the 
protestor’s right to free expression under the First Amendment.  
Id.  The court further concluded that the defendants who issued 
the notices were not entitled to qualified immunity because it 
was clearly established that such an absolute prohibition of 
                                              
challenges the ban based on its absolute prohibition of his 
presence on the Panther Valley campus.    
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speech that “singl[ed] out” the plaintiff to the exclusion of all 
others would be unconstitutional.  Id. at 92–93. 
 
The ban at issue in Huminski is plainly distinguishable 
from the ban at issue here.  Unlike the notices of trespass in 
Huminski that completely foreclosed “any and all” protected 
speech, id. at 92, the Board’s ban left open alternative channels 
for expressive activity, such as permitting Barna to submit 
“reasonable and responsible” written questions, J.A. 292.  
Even assuming Huminski is persuasive authority supporting 
Barna’s position, however, it is insufficient to place the 
“statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”  al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. at 741.   
 
Indeed, the court’s position in Huminski is at least 
partially at odds with the positions adopted by other Courts of 
Appeals.  For instance, in Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648 
(4th Cir. 1999), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
considered the constitutionality of a ban barring the plaintiff 
from entering school property.  Id. at 652.  The plaintiff had 
been progressively disruptive during school board meetings 
and threatening toward school officials.  Id.  The plaintiff 
challenged the ban on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds.  Id. at 653.  The District Court dismissed the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff 
had failed to state a substantial federal claim.  Id. at 654–55.  
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 
emphasizing that “[t]he right to communicate is not limitless,” 
particularly where the plaintiff has engaged in a “continuing 
pattern of verbal abuse and threatening behavior towards 
school officials.”  Id. at 656.  The Court thus upheld the ban 
because the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not “‘directly 
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and sharply’ implicated by . . . [the] prohibition against him.”  
Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
 
Barna has not persuasively distinguished Lovern or 
suggested why its logic does not extend to the qualified 
immunity analysis here.  To the contrary, Barna “freely 
concedes that the protection of school staff implicates a 
significant public interest” and that under Lovern, “school 
officials [are] invested with discretion to remove parents from 
school property in response to a threat of disruption.”  Barna 
Br. 23–24.  Indeed, the Lovern court’s guidance on the scope 
of the “right to communicate” on school property could 
plausibly suggest to a reasonable official that the permanent 
ban at issue here would pass constitutional muster.  Lovern, 
190 F.3d at 656.  Even assuming there is a protected interest in 
participating in school board meetings despite engaging in a 
pattern of threatening and disruptive behavior, we cannot fault 
the individual Board officials for having failed to recognize 
that right as clearly established, particularly in light of the 
Lovern decision and the absence of contrary authority from the 
Supreme Court or our Court.4  See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743 
(“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing 
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open 
legal questions.”).   
                                              
4 The Lovern court was concerned principally with whether 
there is a First Amendment right of access to school property 
— not, as here, whether there is a First Amendment right to 
expression at school board meetings.  We nonetheless believe 
that the two rights are sufficiently similar that officials could 
have relied on Lovern to conclude that their conduct was 
constitutionally permissible in these circumstances.   
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We therefore conclude that, given the state of the law at 
the time of the Board’s ban, there was, at best, disagreement in 
the Courts of Appeals as to the existence of a clearly 
established right to participate in school board meetings 
despite engaging in a pattern of threatening and disruptive 
behavior.5  Even if a “right can be ‘clearly established’ by 
circuit precedent despite disagreement in the courts of 
appeals,” Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045, there does not appear to 
be any such consensus — much less the robust consensus — 
that we require to deem the right Barna asserts here as clearly 
established.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual Board 
members on the basis of qualified immunity.  
 
B. 
 
 We turn to whether summary judgment was properly 
granted in favor of the Board.  The Supreme Court in Owen v. 
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), held that 
municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity from suit for 
damages under § 1983.  See id. at 657 (“[M]unicipalities have 
no immunity from damages liability flowing from their 
                                              
5 Two other Courts of Appeals have addressed the 
constitutionality of a permanent ban of citizens from municipal 
meetings.  See Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 505 (9th Cir. 
2015); Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 871 (7th Cir. 2011).  
Apart from being non-binding precedent in this jurisdiction, 
both cases post-date the imposition of the Board’s ban and thus 
again “are of no use in the clearly established inquiry.”  
Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200 n.4. 
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constitutional violations.”); see also Hynson By & Through 
Hynson v. City of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 934 (3d Cir. 1987).  
The District Court overlooked the Supreme Court’s precedent 
in Owen and improperly awarded qualified immunity to the 
Board.  In his opening brief to this Court, Barna appealed this 
ruling generally, but made no arguments specific to the Board 
entity, did not distinguish among the defendants, and did not 
cite Owen as controlling authority.  The Board, by contrast, 
concedes that qualified immunity does not shield municipal 
entities under Owen but maintains that it is entitled to 
immunity because Barna failed to preserve the issue by not 
addressing it before the District Court or in his opening brief 
to our Court.  The Board argues in the alternative that the 
record does not support liability under Monell v. Department 
of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978).6   
 
We have long recognized, consistent with Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and Third Circuit Local 
                                              
6 Although not subject to respondeat superior liability, 
municipalities may be held directly liable under Monell if they 
adopt a custom or policy that is unconstitutional or that is the 
“moving force” behind any constitutional violation.  See 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).  Municipalities can be held liable 
regardless of whether it was clear at the time of the policy’s 
adoption that such conduct would violate a plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.  Owen, 445 U.S. at 656–57.  Because 
liability may be imposed on a municipality separate and apart 
from the liability imposed on an individual officer, “[t]he 
precedent in our circuit requires the district court to review the 
plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims independently of the 
15 
 
Appellate Rule 28.1, that an appellant’s opening brief must set 
forth and address each argument the appellant wishes to pursue 
in an appeal.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (“[A]ppellants are required to set forth the issues 
raised on appeal and to present an argument in support of those 
issues in their opening brief.”); see also Laborers’ Int’l Union 
of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding that an argument is not preserved “unless a 
party raises it in its opening brief”); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 
811 F.2d 793, 795 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that appellants 
did not preserve an issue “[b]y failing to raise this issue in their 
original briefs”).  To be preserved, all arguments must be 
supported specifically by “the reasons for them, with citations 
to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant 
relies.”  Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).  As a result, we have 
consistently refused to consider ill-developed arguments or 
those not properly raised and discussed in the appellate 
briefing.  See Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 
812, 821 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “passing and 
conclusory statements do not preserve an issue for appeal”).  
Nor will we reach arguments raised for the first time in a reply 
brief or at oral argument.  See In re Grand Jury, 635 F.3d 101, 
105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (declining to consider argument first 
raised at oral argument); In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 558 F.3d 
234, 246 n.15 (3d Cir. 2009) (same); In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 
                                              
section 1983 claims against the individual . . . officers.”  
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 
Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“A finding of municipal liability does not depend 
automatically or necessarily on the liability of a police 
officer.”).  
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224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003) (deeming unpreserved a claim that was 
omitted from appellant’s initial brief and raised for first time in 
a reply brief).  
 
The rules requiring preservation of issues serve 
“important judicial interests.”  Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 
F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Webb v. City of Phila., 
562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009)); see also Hormel v. 
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558 (1941) (recognizing the 
“desirability and existence of a general practice under which 
appellate courts confine themselves to the issues raised 
below”).  The rules promote finality by encouraging parties to 
advance all relevant arguments and by binding counsel to their 
strategic choices.  See Wheatley v. Wicomico Cty., 390 F.3d 
328, 334–35 (4th Cir. 2004); Sigmon Fuel Co. v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 754 F.2d 162, 164 (6th Cir. 1985).  Accordingly, once 
parties choose their arguments, they may only pursue those 
arguments.  See Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 
608 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the rules “prevent parties 
from getting two bites at the apple”).   
 
The preservation rules also protect litigants from unfair 
surprise.  Webb, 562 F.3d at 263.  Additionally, preservation 
rules promote judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial 
resources by respecting the work of the court of first instance.  
Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012) (admonishing 
reviewing courts “not [to] overlook” the “processes and time 
investment” of the court of first instance).  This prevents those 
courts expending time to consider and resolve arguments 
advanced by counsel only to be “reversed on grounds that were 
never urged or argued” before trial courts.  Caisson Corp. v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672, 680 (3d Cir. 1980).   
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The effect of failing to preserve an argument will 
depend upon whether the argument has been forfeited or 
waived.  The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he terms 
waiver and forfeiture — though often used interchangeably by 
jurists and litigants — are not synonymous.”  Hamer v. 
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, No. 16-658, 2017 WL 
5160782, at *3 n.1 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2017).  “Waiver is different 
from forfeiture,” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993), and the distinction can carry great significance.7  See 
Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (“Waiver is accomplished by intent, but forfeiture 
comes about through neglect.” (quoting United States v. 
Zubia–Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008))).  
“[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 
right,” an example of which is an inadvertent failure to raise an 
argument.  Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.  Waiver, in contrast, “is the 
‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.’”  Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938)).  The Supreme Court has deemed an argument waived, 
for example, when a party “twice informed the U.S. District 
                                              
7 Waived claims may not be resurrected on appeal.  See Wood, 
566 U.S. at 471 n.5 (distinguishing waivers and forfeitures and 
observing that “a federal court has the authority to resurrect 
only forfeited defenses”); United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A waiver is unlike a forfeiture, for the 
consequence of a waiver is that the objection is 
unreviewable.”); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 
283, 290 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Lockett, 406 
F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The waiver of an appeal will 
not be invalidated merely because unanticipated events occur 
in the future.”). The effect of a forfeiture is discussed infra.  
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Court that it [would] not challenge, but [is] not conceding, the 
timeliness of [the action].”  Wood, 566 U.S. at 465 (third 
alteration added) (internal quotation marks omitted); United 
States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We have 
found waiver where either a defendant or his attorney expressly 
declined to press a right . . . .”).   
 
Because of the important interests underlying the 
preservation doctrine, we will not reach a forfeited issue in 
civil cases absent truly “exceptional circumstances.”  Brown v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001).  Such 
“circumstances have been recognized when the public interest 
requires that the issue[s] be heard or when a manifest injustice 
would result from the failure to consider the new issue[s].”  
United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 
150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Fleck v. KDI Sylvan 
Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Flynn v. 
Comm’r, 269 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“exceptional circumstances” may exist where the case involves 
“uncertainty in the law; novel, important, and recurring 
questions of federal law; intervening change in the law; and 
extraordinary situations with the potential for miscarriages of 
justice”).  Departure from the established preservation rule is a 
“narrow exception” to the general bar on such review, 
Syverson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 601 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir. 
2010), and so we will depart only in very “limited” 
circumstances, Webb, 562 F.3d at 263.  See also Tri-M Grp., 
638 F.3d at 434 (Hardiman, J., concurring) (noting that “truly 
exceptional circumstances” must exist before we will reach an 
unpreserved issue); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing 
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that the issues that merit review despite failure to preserve fall 
into an “extraordinary category” of cases). 
 
Although our narrow exceptional circumstances rule 
applies to all forfeited issues, we have been slightly less 
reluctant to bar consideration of a forfeited pure question of 
law.  See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557.  We have thus observed that 
we will reach “a pure question of law even if not raised below 
where refusal to reach the issue would result in a miscarriage 
of justice or where the issue’s resolution is of public 
importance.”  Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 189–90 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 
632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011) (addressing a “purely legal 
question” despite the appellant’s failure to preserve the issue); 
City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 
140 (2d Cir. 2011) (excusing a forfeiture when the issue was 
“purely legal” and the default results from inadvertence); 
Council of Alt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 69 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (reaching for the “first time on appeal” an issue that 
“concerns a pure question of law”); cf. N.J. Carpenters & the 
Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp., 760 F.3d 297, 305 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“It is appropriate for us to reach an issue that the 
district court did not if ‘the issues provide purely legal 
questions, upon which an appellate court exercises plenary 
review.’” (quoting Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. 
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998))).   
 
With these principles in mind, we first ask whether the 
issue of the Board’s immunity is properly preserved, and if not, 
whether that failure to preserve constitutes a forfeiture or a 
waiver.  Barna argues here that he adequately preserved the 
issue of the Board’s entitlement to immunity because in both 
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his District Court and appellate briefing, he cited to cases 
which themselves reference the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Owen.  Barna Reply Br. 4.  Such implicit references to the 
Owen decision do not suffice under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 28(a) and our Rule 28.1, which require briefs 
to contain statements of all issues presented for appeal, 
together with supporting arguments and citations.  See Kost, 1 
F.3d at 182.  Although Barna broadly challenged the District 
Court’s grant of qualified immunity, he did not differentiate 
among the defendants.  We do not regard such cursory 
treatment as sufficient to bring the issue of the Board’s lack of 
entitlement to immunity before our Court on appeal.  See In re 
Surrick, 338 F.3d at 237.  That Barna addressed the Owen 
decision solely in his reply brief also does not redeem his 
failure to do so in his opening brief.  Laborers’ Int’l Union, 26 
F.3d at 398.  We therefore conclude that Barna failed to 
preserve the issue of the Board’s immunity by not addressing 
it at any level beyond mere generalities.   
 
We next must determine whether Barna’s failure 
constitutes a waiver or forfeiture.  The Board characterizes 
Barna’s failure to raise the Owen issue as a waiver.  Board Br. 
42–43.  Barna’s failures to raise the Owen issue in the District 
Court as well as in his opening brief to our Court, however, 
appear to have been inadvertent omissions.  Under the 
framework described above, they are therefore more properly 
characterized as forfeitures rather than as waivers.  See Olano, 
507 U.S. at 733.  We accordingly must consider whether there 
are truly exceptional circumstances to excuse this forfeiture.   
Turning to that inquiry, we believe that the 
circumstances of this case compel our review here.  The 
District Court’s legally incorrect holding granting “judgment 
in favor of the Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity,” 
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J.A. 51, directly contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Owen.  The availability of qualified immunity for a municipal 
entity is thus precisely the type of “pure question of law” that 
commands our attention.  Tri-M Grp., 638 F.3d at 418; Bagot, 
398 F.3d at 256 (deciding the merits of a forfeited claim where 
“the proper resolution of the legal question, though not exactly 
simple, [wa]s reasonably certain”).  Holding otherwise would 
problematically permit the District Court’s pure legal error to 
stand uncorrected.  See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 
F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing the district court’s 
award of qualified immunity to a municipality as an erroneous 
“conclusion of law” and remanding for consideration in light 
of Owen).   
 
Moreover, reaching the Owen issue here would not 
implicate the prudential concerns underlying the forfeiture 
doctrine.  Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
Board, which itself raised the Owen issue, would not be 
unfairly surprised by judicial consideration of the issue.  See 
Barefoot Architect, 632 F.3d at 835.  To the contrary, the 
parties discussed the matter at oral argument and subsequently 
provided supplemental briefing on it.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Owen is long-standing authority that has 
been repeatedly cited in our precedents on qualified immunity.  
See, e.g., Kelly, 622 F.3d at 263; Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 
98 F.3d 116, 126 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996); Carver v. Foerster, 102 
F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1996).  We therefore do not believe that 
the Board would be unduly surprised by our consideration of 
the issue in this context.   
Considering Owen here is also in accord with the 
approach adopted by our sister circuit Courts of Appeals, 
which have reached the issue notwithstanding the appellant’s 
failure to preserve the issue.  For instance, in Hedge v. County 
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of Tippecanoe, 890 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1989), the appellant failed 
to raise the Owen issue before the district court.8  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the “fail[ure] to bring 
th[e] case to the attention of the trial judge” did not prevent 
appellate consideration of the issue.  Id. at 8.  The Hedge court 
concluded, inter alia, that because the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Owen “prohibits a governmental body, as a matter 
of law, from asserting the defense of qualified immunity,” that 
case precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
municipal entity notwithstanding the appellant’s failure to 
preserve the issue.  Id.  The decision in Hedge is persuasive 
authority suggesting that the Board should not be permitted to 
utilize a defense to which it is not legally entitled.   
 
Several of our sister Courts of Appeals have similarly 
reversed a district court’s qualified immunity ruling where, 
regardless of the preservation posture, the district court erred 
in overlooking the Owen issue.  For instance in Sample v. City 
of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2016), the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit remanded for consideration of 
the municipality’s liability where the District Court “did not 
distinguish the claims” against the individual officials and the 
municipality.9  The Sample court aptly noted that it could not 
                                              
8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit characterized 
the appellant’s failure to raise the Owen issue as a “waiver.”  
Hedge, 890 F.2d at 8.  In light of the discussion herein, we 
believe it is more aptly characterized as a forfeiture.   
 
9 The decision in Sample concerned the District Court’s legally 
incorrect award of absolute immunity to the municipality.  Its 
holding nevertheless applies with equal force with respect to 
an award of qualified immunity.  See Leatherman v. Tarrant 
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simply “ignore [the] reasoning in Owen.”  Id. at 917.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted a similar 
position in Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 2013), 
where it too confronted a failure to distinguish the individual 
defendants from the municipal defendant.  See id. at 254 (“To 
rule, as the district court did, that the City of New York escapes 
liability for the tortious conduct of its police officers because 
the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity would 
effectively extend the defense of qualified immunity to 
municipalities, contravening the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Owen.”).  These cases persuasively suggest that the public 
interest would be better served by addressing the Owen issue 
than by ignoring it.10 
 
For all of these reasons, we conclude that there are 
exceptional circumstances permitting review of the otherwise 
forfeited issue of the Board’s entitlement to immunity.  
Because the District Court erred in awarding qualified 
immunity to the Board, we will vacate with respect to the grant 
of summary judgment in the Board’s favor.  We take no 
position on the viability of the claims against the Board, 
                                              
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
166 (1993) (observing that it is “quite clear that, unlike various 
government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity 
from suit — either absolute or qualified — under § 1983.”).   
10 Although forfeiture of the Owen issue was not discussed in 
detail in either Sample or Askins, we regard both cases as 
persuasive authority indicating that not distinguishing the 
individual defendants from the municipal defendant pursuant 
to Owen is the type of pure legal error requiring remand.   
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including whether Barna has even stated a claim under Monell, 
leaving that determination to the District Court.  We will 
accordingly vacate and remand so that the District Court may 
consider the Board’s liability in the first instance.11   
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the individual 
officials of the Panther Valley School Board in their individual 
capacities.  We will vacate the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Panther Valley School Board and the 
individual officials in their official capacities and will remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
                                              
11 Our analysis as to the Board applies to the individual 
officials, as sued in their official capacities only.  See Santos v. 
Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 470 (4th Cir. 
2013); Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 164 (2d Cir. 
2012).  Therefore, we will also vacate the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the individual officials, as sued 
in their official capacities.  
 
